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No. 78-1595
LEWIS
v.

Cert. to CA 4 (per
Russell; Winter
dissenting)

UNITED STATES

Federal/Criminal

SUMMARY:

The

issue presented

is whether

· 'I'imely

a man may be con-

victed for possessing a firearm after he has been convicted of a
felony

even though he was denied assistance of

counsel at the

time he previously was convicted.
FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

In 1961, petitioner was convicted

of a felony in the Florida courts.

In this proceeding,

he was

- 2 charged

for

violating

18 U.S.C.

App.

§

1202(a} (1},

which pro-

vides:
"Any person who-- (1} has been convicted by a court of th.e
United States or of a state or any political subdivision
thereof of a felony .
• and who receives, possesses, or
transports in commerce or affecting commerce
any
firearm shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . •
"
On

the

day

trial court

of

trial,

that he had

petitioner's

attorney

informed

the

just learned that petitioner had been

denied assistance of counsel at the time of the 1961 conviction,
and sought a continuance to procure copies of the Florida court
records to prove this fact.

The trial judge denied the continu-

ance on the ground that whether petitioner was denied assistance
of counsel at the time of his prior conviction was immaterial to
the offense charged.
basis of
felony

undisputed

and

had

Petitioner was tried and convicted on the
evidence

possessed

a

that
weapon

he

had

which

been convicted of
previously

had

a

been

shipped in interstate commerce.
A
§

divided

Appeals

of

affirmed.

It

construed

1202 (a} (1} as evidencing an intent to make the historical fact

of a

felony conviction,

establish
was
§

Court

the

invalid

1202(a} (1}

not theretofore vacated,

crime without

under

regard

Gideon v.

for

Wainwright.

whether

sufficient to
the conviction

It further

held that

was constitutional as so construed, because even a

conviction obtained

witho~t

defense counsel establishes probable

cause to believe the defendant had committed a felony,

and Con-

- 3 -

gress may prohibit a man from possessing

firearms

if

there

probable cause to believe . he has committed a felony.

is

The court

noted that other Circuits had reached a contrary result.
Judge Winter dissented.
conclusion
was

as

to

He found no support for the court's

legislative

intent,

noting

that

1202 (a} (1}

§

introduced as a last minute amendment on the floor without

any legislative history addressing this precise issue.

He fur-

ther

as

concluded

that

the

strued by the majority.

statute

was

unconstitutional

He argued that the case was

con-

indistin-

guishable from this Court's decisions holding that a conviction
obtained in violation of Gideon may not be used for purposes of
a recidivist prosecution, Burgett v. Texas, 389

u.s.

109 (1976},

or to impeach a criminal defendant, Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S.

473

(1972}.
CONTENTIONS: Petitioner contends that a prior felony conviction obtained in violation of the defendant's right to counsel
may not be

used

to establish a

argues that the decision below
wright,
443

Burgett,

(1972}

Loper,

violation of § 1.202 (a} (1}.
is contrary to Gideon v.

and United States v.

Tucker,

Wain-

404 U.S.

(conviction obtained in violation of Gideon may not

be considered in fixing sentence}.

He observes that there is a

substantial conflict among the Circuits on the issue.
enth

He

and Ninth Circuits hold

that convictions

The Sev-

in violation of

Gideon may not be used to establish violations of § 1202 (a} (1),
while the Third, Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits are in agree-

· - 4ment with the decision below.
The

Solicitor

General

agrees

that

certiorari

should

be

granted to resolve the conflict among the Circuits, even though
he contends that the decision below was correct.
DISCUSSION:

This

case

squarely

presents

a

constitutional

issue on which there is a substantial division among the Courts
of Appeals.

In addition, the decision below seems inconsistent

with this Court's decisions in Burgett, Loper and Tucker.
There is a response.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM ':fo ~ ~ ~

.r

~~~-a~~

~-~.

To:

~~,Lo~
~~-1-o~~

Mr. Justice Powell

Re: No. 78-1595, Lewis v. United State ~~

~

)ls ~

~ ;.;:;;. - ..e'.e.k. ~

1.

·

18

tJ-/" ~ U. ~.C. App. _§

H-..JA.. c~,t_~_.. /J-;-:.
1 20 2 (a) ( 1 ) ... ...,..... ---,

1 /> /-o

CZ

t!:;{;,~

4./.V

.

. ___

o.n

~ ~~~~U/~

1.1~
~

PRESENTED.

provides that "any person who ••. has be: /
htt.'-"~ ~
the United States or of a State or any political subdivision

--~

~-

ISSUE

thereof of a felony .•• and who receives, possesses, or transports

~.

d"~ vP~

· in commerce or affecting commerce ..• ..__
any firearm shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years,
or both."
§

1202(c)(2)

punishable by

defines

"felony"

as

imprisonment for a term exceeding

"any

offense

=one year,

but

does not include any offense (other than one involving a firearm

2.

or explosive)

classified as a misdemeanor under the laws of a

State and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or
less."
1 20 3 provides that

§

prisoner

who

has

been

§

1 20 2 is not applicable to any

entrusted

with

a

firearm

by

prison

authorities, or any person who has been pardoned and authorized
to receive

firearms

by

the

President or chief executive of

a

State.
The question in this case is whether a defendant who is
a previously convicted felon may challenge the constitutionality
of his prior conviction under Gideon v. Wainwright as a defense
to a prosecution
2.
1203

under~

DISCUSSION.

is ~

1202(a) (1).
The

legislative

history of

§§

1202

&

These sections were added as a last minute floor

"UAJt~

~~

.

amendment in the Senate to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe "~ ·
Streets

Act.

"The

Amendment

was

hastily passed,

with

little

discussion, no hearings, and no report." United States ::..:._ Bass,
404

U.S.

amendment

336,
he

344

(1971).

stated

that

When

Senator

"[w]hile

we

-

Long

may

be

introduced
willing

the

for

a

citizen to have a gun for the defense of his home ••• we do not
want the murderers,

the burglars, the rapists, the looters, or

the arsonists armed to the teeth and walking the streets. We do
not want the habitual criminals who have committed all sorts of
crimes armed and presenting a hazard to law-abiding citizens."
114

Cong.

Rec.

13868

( 1968).

This

langauge

demonstrates

that

3.

Congress

wished

firearms.
clear

to

prevent

dangerous

persons

from

obtaining

The legislative history does not, however, provide a

indication

that

Congress

intended

that

a

person

who

"face[d] the danger of conviction because he [did] not know how
to establish his innocence" Powell .::..:._ f\labama,
69

(1932),

should

be

considered

to

be

a

287 U.S. 45, 68"felon"

under

§

1202(a)(1).
The

SG argues

that

the

structure of

the

Omnibus Act

~

demonstrates

that

Congress
....

wished

to

employ

even

an

invalid

1202

(a)(1).

~......__.,

conviction as indicative of dangerousness under§

The SG relies heavily on 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) & (h) which makes it
unlawful for any person "who is under indictment for, or who has
been

convicted

in

any

court

of,

a

crime

punishable

by

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" to ship or receive
firearms.

-...___

The SG contends that because person convicted without

~

a lawyer more likely to be dangerous than a person who has been
'\
~
indicted, Congress must have intended that a person convicted

-

-

--

-

--------------~

without a lawyer be barred from purchasing a firearm.
or

vr/

not

the SG' s

simple

fact

than§

922(g),

assessment of dangerousness

is that the scope of §
and that,

therefore,

1202(a) ( 1)

is

Whether

accurate,

the

is more limited

the desire of Congress

to

~

reach persons who have been indicted under § 922(g) has little
relevance to an interpretation of §1202(a) (1).
The SG also argues that the presence of §1203 mandates
a a broad construction of§ 1202(a)(1).

The SG says that§ 1203

4.

permits

two

therfore,

exceptions

this

exception

Court

that

to

the

should

Congress

application

be

reluctant

failed

to

of

to

§

1202

create

create.

This

and,

a

third

argument

slighlty mischaracterizes the issue in the case. The question is
not whether a person convicted in violation of Gideon should be
excluded
whether

from

the

Congress

operation

ever

of

intended

§

1202(a) (1);

such

a

person

rather
to

be

it

is

included

within the prohibition. The presence of exemptions for persons
who do fall

within §1202(a)(1) does not define the scope of§

1202(a)(1).
Two r ~ ules of statutory construction relevant

to this

case suggest that the petitioenr's position should be adopted.

c § is

--

avoid

a

the principle that a statute to be construed so as to
serious

constitutional

question. ~,

"ambiguity

concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in
favor

of

(1971).

lenity."

Rewis

Although

the

v.
SG

United
argues

States,
that

~

401

U.S.

1202(a) (1)

808,

812

is

not

ambiguous enough to allow the use of either rule of statutory
construction,

I

believe

that

the

language

and

legislative

hi ~~ of that statute is sufficiently unclear so as to permit
reliance on these guildeines.
This

Court's cases concerning the use of convictions

obtained in violation of Gideon -v. Wainwright
suggest that the
.
statute should not be interpreted in the manner favored by the
SG.

In

Burgett

v.

United

States,

389

u.s.

109

(1967),

a

5.

defendant had been indicted for assault with intent to murder,
and

for

being

an

habitual

offender

because

been convicted of four other felonies.
to

the

jury.

previous

When

the

convictions,

State
the

they had been obtained

attempted

defense

he

had

previously

The indictment was read
to

offer

proof

of

objected on the ground

the
that

in violation of Gideon. The trial judge

sustained some of the defense objections, allowed evidence of a
Tennessee conviction to be introduced, but ordered the jury not
to consider the prior convictions. The habitual offender charge
was

taken

found

from

that

sufficient

the

the
times

jury,

presumably

because

defendant

had

not

to

the

recidivist

invoke

been

the

trial

judge

validly

convicted

statute.

The

jury

found the defendant guilty of assault with intent to murder.
This

Court

stated

that

the

trial

court

erred

in

allowing the introduction of evidence of the Tennesee conviction
because the records of that conviction raised a presumption that
the

defendant

had

been

denied

his

right

to

counsel,

and

the

trial court could not presume waiver of that right from a silent
record.
~

"To permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon

Wainwright

to

be

used

against

a

person

either

to

support

guilt or to enhance punishment for another offense ••• is to erode
the principle of that case.
prior

conviction

accussed

in

was

effect

Sixth Amendment

denial

suffers

right."

Worse yet, since the defect in the

388

of

the

anew

from

U.S.

at

right
the
11 5.

counsel,

the

deprivation of

that

The

to

Court

then held

6.

that

the

conviction

for

assault

with

intent

to

murder

was

invalid because the trial court had allowed introduction of the
In ~ urgett, therefore, this Court stated it

invalid convcition.
was

error

for

a

trial

court

to

allow

consideration

of

a

conviction which was shown to be invalid under Gideon and stated
that an uncounselled felony convicton could not be used under an
habitual offender statute.
In

subsequent

cases,

this

Court

has

held

that

a

conviction obtained in violation of Gideon may not be used for
/

sentencing

pruposes, VUnited

States

v.

Tucker,

u.s.

404

--~

Loper~

(1972), or to impeach a defendant who has testified,
Beto,

405

U.S.

constitutionality

473

(1973).

of

the

In

prior

~per,

as

in

conviction

Burgett,

was

443

the
in

raised

proceedings concerning the validity of a subsequent conviction.
Id. at 476. The effect of these cases would seem to be that the
use of an uncounselled felony conviction to obtain a conviction
under §1202(a)(1)

is unconstitutional.

previous conviction in this case

is

Indeed,

the use of the

identical to

its proposed

use under the habitual offender statute considered in Burgett.
In

both

situations,

a

previous

convict ion

forms

part

of

the
$ &

predicate of a subsequent, and analytically, separate offense.
The

SG

argues

that

distinguishable from this case.
uncounselled
Illinois.

conviction

While

it

is

is

not

true

Burgett
First,
always
that

and

its

progeny

are ~~

the SG arques that an
invalid,

Scott

see

states

Scott
that

v.
all

'::j.d:Jt:

7.

uncounseled convictions are not constitutionally i~id, Scott
offers no support for the contention that a conviction which is
constitutionally invalid may be used at trial.

Second,

the SG

says that the rationale of the Burgett 1 ine of cases was that
the invalid convictions were unreliable
1202(a) ( 1)

whereas the focus of

§

is on the fact of the previous conviction, not its

reliability. This argument begs the question of whether Congress

---

meant

to

include

§1202(a)(1).

persons

Moreover,

with

it

invalid

seems more

convictions

logical

to

within

assume

that

Congress used the presence of a conviction

as a indicator of

dangerousness.

is

Insofar

as

the

conviction

less

reliable

because it was obtained in violation of Gideon, it is presumably
Third,

also less predictive of future dangerouseness.

the SG

contends that in Burgett the government first attempted to use
the prior uncounselled conviction at the time of the subsequent
trial whereas

§

1202(a) (1)

imposes a liability upon a person as

soon as the previous felony conviction is final. But the effect
of the habitual offender statute in Burgett and§ 1202(a0(1) is
identical.

Both

laws

inform

a

convicted

felon

that

the

commission of certain additional acts will subject him to a new
criminal

penalty.

In

uncounselled

felony

tension with

the

sum,

I

believe

conviction

in

that

this

reasoning of Burgett,

§1202(a) (1) should be

~d

the

case

use
is

Tucker

in

of

a

prior

sufficient

and Loper

that

to allow a defendant to challenge the

use of a prior conviction on the ground that it was obtained in

/~

..

8.

violation of Gideon v. Wainwright.
The SG raises two related objections to a decision in

~·

S

fl
~

Js

~~~

the petitioner's favor. l~ -~~/ ' he argues that ~1 constitutional ~~
challenges to previous convictions would have to be considered
in a §1202(a)(1) proceeding. This issue need not be decided in
the

present

case.

Moreover,

it

may

be

that

constitutional

claims that do not challenge the reliability of the conviction
would not have to be considered
But

the

existence

of

a

Gideon

in a§

violation

convictions

attacks

Loper~

integrity of the fact-finding process."
at 484. Qe ~

1202(a)(1) proceeding.
"the

very

Beto, 405 U.S.

the SG arques that consideration of previous

would

be

disruptive

that potential exists,

and

time

consuming.

ALthough

it is unlikely so long as the

issue in

dispute is whether a petitioner was represented by counsel at a
prior

trial.

In

some

cases

it may

be

difficult

to

ascertain

whether a defendant had the assistance of counsel, see Loper
Beto,

405 U.S.

~nd

Chief Justice
claim

is

at 500

more

~

(Rehnquist J., dissenting with whom the

Blackmun & Powell, JJ.
likely

to

be

easily

joined), but a Gideon
resolved

than

other

constitutional issues.
3. SUMMARY. The question is whether a defendant who is
a previously convicted felon may challenge the constitutionality
of his prior conviction under Gideon
to

a

prosecution

history

of

§

under§

1 20 2 (a) ( 1 )

~

1202(a)(1).
is

Wainwright as a defense
Because

ambiguous,

two

the

legislative

principles

of

'.

9.

statutory construction should be consulted: (1) A statute should
be

construed

to

avoid

an

unconstitutional

result,

ambiguity in criminal statutes should be resolved

and

(2)

in favor of

the defendant. The reasoning of the cases prohibiting the use of
convictions

obtained

in

suggests that use of an

violation

of

Gideon

v.

Wainwright

invalid conviction in this case would

probably be unconstitutional.

Therefore, the statute should be

construed in the petitioner's favor.
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MR. JuRTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether a defeudant's
extant prior conviction, flawed because he was without coun- ~
sel, as required by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
may const1tute the predicate for a subsequellt conviction under
§ 1202 (a) ( 1) , as amended , of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. ·c. App.
§ 1202 (a) ( 1).1

f

I
In 1961 petitioner George Calvin Lewis, Jr., upon his plea
Section 1:202 (a) n·ads in full:
"Any prr~un who" (1) has lwc·n eonvi C'trd by a eourt. of thr United Stairs or of a State or
any politirHI ~ub di v i ,;ion thereof of a felony , or
" (2) ha,; he(•n di~rhargPd from thr Armed Force~ under dishonorable
condition, , or
" (3) ha~ I)('Cil adjudged by a court of the UnitPcl Sta!Ps or of a State
or any polttlr:tl ~nbdivi~ion tlwrrof of hPing mentally in('otnpet<·nt, or
''(4) having h<'!'ll a citizen of the United State~ has renounced hi:s citizenship, or
" (5) being an alien is ill('.gally or unlawfully in thr United Stales,
"and who rereJV<'~, po s~r~H('S, or t rnnsport;; in commE·n·e or afff'etmg C'ommerce, after the datP of ruactrnent of thi:; Act, any firrarm ~ hall b(' fined
not more than $10,000 or: imprisoned for not niore than two yrars, or
both / '
1
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of guilty, was convicted in a Florida state court of a felony
for breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor. Ree Fla. Stat. § 810.05 (1961). He served a term of
imprisomnent. That conviction has never been overturned,
nor has petitioner ever received a qualifying pardon or permission from the Secretary of the Treasury to possess a firearm. Sec 18 U. S. C. App. § 1203 (a) and "18 U. S. C.
§ 925 (c).
In January 1977, Lewis, on probable cause, was arrested in
Virginia, and later was charged by indictment with having
knowingly received and possessed at that time a specified
firearm, w violation of 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202 (a)(1). 2 He
waived a .i ury and was given a bench trial. It was stipulated
that the "' Papon in question had been shipped in interstate
commerce. The Government introduced in evidence an exemplified copy of the judgment and sentence in the 1961 Florida
felony proceeding. App. 10.
ShorLly before the trial, petitioner's counsel illformed the
court tbat he had been advised that Lewis was not represented
by counsel in the 1961 Florida proceediug.a He claimed that
2

ThP imltetmeJJt a];:o

eharge~l

prtitioll('r with a violation of lR U. . C.

§ !)22 (h) (1) That ~tatutr read:; in pertinent part :
"It :-;hall lw unlawful for any ppr,.;on" ( 1) who 1:- uudPr indictment for, or who hal:i bPen eouvirted in any
court of, a c·nnu· pullil:ihable by impn~onment for a term exeerding one
year;

"to rrot>ivc1 any fire:mn ... whic·h has been ~hipped or transported in
inter:;tate ... c·ommeree."
Petitiorwr we~:-~ ac·quitted on the § 922 (h) (1) charge and it i::. not before
us here .
3 Petit.ioncr'b (·oun:;el l:itated thai. a Florida n.t.torncy had advi~ed him
that the C'Ourt rPeord8 in that. State ~howed affirmatiYely that Lewis had
no lawyer. Ht> noted al:;o that Lewil:' had been charged with the same
offenl:ie 11~ had thr defrndant in Gideon v. WaintNight, :172 U. S. 3:35
(196:~) , nnd that pPtitwnPr hnd been tried in the ~amr State abont Hix
month~:; lll•fon· G1deon was t.ried. App. 2-3.

·.
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under Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, a violation of § 1202
(a) (1) coulcl not be predicated on a prior conviction obtained
in violation of petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. The court rejected that claim, ruling that the constitutionality of the outstanding Florida conviction was immaterial with respect to petitioner's status uncler ~ 1202 (a) ( 1)
as a previously couvictecl felon at the time of his arrest. Petitioner, accordingly, oft'ered no evidence as to whether in fact
he hatllwen convicted in 1961 without the aid of counsel. We
therefore assume, for present purposes, that he was without
counsel at that time.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. by a divided vote, affirmed. 5D1 F. 2d 978
(1979). It held that a defenclant, purely as a defense to a
prosecutio11 under~ 1202 (a)(1), could not attack collaterally
an outstancling prior felouy COJlviction, and that the statutory
prohibition applied irrespective of whether that prior conviction was subject to collateral attack. The Court of Appeals
also rejected Lewis' constitutional argument to the eft'ect that
the use of the prior conviction as a preclicate for his prosecution under~ 1202 (a)(l) violated his rights uncler the Fifth
and Sixth AnH:'nchnents.
Becausp of conflict among the Courts of Appeals/ we
granted certiorari. 442 1!. S.- (1979).
C'ompan· f ' 11ited States v. Lufman, 457 F. 2d (CA7 1!-17::!) (u~c of nn
fp]ony eonvietion unconstitutionally obtaitwd to ~liJlJlOI't :~
con\'ietion undPr § 1202 (a) (1) i~ r<•ver,;iblr error) with th<• Fourth Circuit'o; ruliug in the pres<·nt <'ase, and with United States v. Mauganl, 573
F . 2d 02G (C'Ati Hl7~); and United States v. Grave:s, 554 F . 2d (i5 (CA:3
1977) (en banr) (elaim of con~titutional error in the tmd<•rlyiug eonviction rna~· not be rnii'ied). Tlw :\mth Circuit hm; dio;tinguii'iiH:'d betwepn a
claim of eon~tJtutwnal invalidity in the underlying conviction, which it ha"
held may he nll~<'d, and a claim that the und<'rlying convictiOn ha:-< bPen,
or should bt•, rPV<'f~0d on other grou11dR. Compare Cnited .States v.
U'Neal , 545 F 2d R5 (1976), and United States v. Pril'epaul. 540 F . 2d
417 (197o) , w1th [' nited States , .. Liles, 4:32 F. 2d 18 (1!:!70) . SE·e alo;o
United &ofl!8 \. li errl!ll, 5R8 F. 2d 711 (CA9 1!:!7:8), <:ert. drniPd, 4!01
4

undcrl~·mg
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II
Four cases decided by this Court provide the focus for petitioner's attack upon his conviction. The first, and pivotal
one. is Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, where the Court held that
a state felony conviction without counsel, and without a valid
waiver of counsel, was unconstitutional under the Sixth and
U.S. 9fi.t (1079) (undPrl~·ing conviction in :1 prosPcution under 18 U.S. C.
§ 922 (h) (I) may not. be ehallPngPd on nonconstitutional grounds).
Tlw identical i~sue that i~ pre~ented in this case ha~ alHo ari~en in the
context of ehallt•uge~ to convietion~ under 18 U. S. C. § 922 (g) (1) (pro1-criuing ~luppmg or tnmH]lort of a firearm in inter::;tate or foreign commere<' h) a p<'rHon under indictment for, or convicted of, a felony) and
§ 9:22 (h) ( 1) (pru~cribing rPcript of a firearm ~hipped in intero:;tate or
foreign eouimNcl' by :<neh a Jler~on). Compare United States v. Scales,
S99 F . 2d /,'- (CAS 1979); Dameron Y. United States, 488 F. 2d 724 (CAS
1974); Pa~terchik v. Uuited States, 466 F. 2d 1367 (CA9 1972); and
United 8Late~ v. DuShane, 43S F. 2d 1H7 (CA2 1970) (underlying conviction may br attac·ked u::; unconstitutional) with Barker v. Vuited States,
S79 F . 2d 1219. 1226 (CAlO 1978) (underlying conviction may not be so
rhallt•ng<'d iu vmsrcution under § 922 (h) (1)).
Thr Court::; of Appeab hnvr treated the io>sne somewhat d11ferently in
Jlro:-;ec·utwn~ under lH ll. S. C. § 922 (a) (H) (prohibiting thr falsification
of one '~ statu~ a~ a convicted felon in purcha:;ing a firearm) . Nonuniformit~· ha::; prrvallPd nonetheleo:;~ on the quc:;tion whether a defrndant charged
with violatlll{!; that ::;tatute rna~' challenge thr con~titutionaltty of the
underlying f(•lon~ <·onvJction. Compare United States '. O'Neal, supm,
and Unit!!d .State~ Y. Pli.cepaul, supra, (permitting thP challenge) with
Uuited States ' . Allen, SS6 F. 2d 720 (CA4 1977); United States v.
Gmvrs, supra; and Cassity Y. United States, S21 F. 2d 1320 (CA6 197S)
(holding that tlw challenge may uot be made). The Eighth Circuit has
!:'fated that If will not permit a challenge to thr constitutionality of the
underl~· iug convwtiou where tlw defendant is charged undt•r § 922 (a.) (6),
while re:;prving thr question undrr § 1202 (a) (1) and §§ 922 (g) (1) aud
(h)(l) . ('mted .States v. Edward8, S68 F. 2d 68,70-72, and 11.3 (1977) .
See al~o l 'mted .States v. Graves, SS4 F. 2d, at 83-88 (Garth, J. & Seitz,
C . .T., concnJTing t\: di:ss?IHing) (thr Government nred not prove the
validity of the umlerlying conviction in a prosecution brought under § 922'
(a)((j) , but it mu::;t do so in a prosecution under §1202 (a)(1)) ..
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Fourteenth Amelldments. That's fully retroactive. Kitchens
v. Smith, 401 U. S. 847 (1971).
The second case is Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 (1967).
There the Court held that a conviction invalid under Gideon
could not be used for enhaucement of punishment under a
State's recidivist statute. The third is United States v.
1''ucker, 404 r. S. 443 ( 1972), where it was held that such a
convictiou could uot be co11sidered by a court iu sentencing
a defendant after a subsequent conviction. And the fourth is
Loper v. Beta, 405 U. S. 473 (1972), where the Court disallowed thP use of the couviction to impeach the general
credibility of the defendant. The prior conviction, the plurality opinion said, "lacked reliability." !d., at 484. quoting
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 F. S. 618, 639, and n. 20 (1965).
We, of course, accept these rulings for purposes of the
present cas<>. Petitionet~'s position, however, is that the four
cases require a reversal of his conviction under ~ 1202 (a) (1)
on both statutory and constitutional grounds.

IIl
The Court has stated repeatedly of late that in any case
concerning the interpretation of a statute the "starting point"
must be the language of the statute itself. Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., - F. S. - , - (1979) (slip op., pp. 3-4). 8ee also
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,- U. S. - , (1979)
(slip op., pp. 7- 8); Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
-U.S. - . (1979) (slip op., p. 6). An examination of
§ 1202 (a) ( 1) reveals that its proscription is directed unambiguously at any person who "has been convicted by a court
of the Unit€•d States or of a State ... of a felony." No modifier is present. and nothing suggests any restriction on the
scope of th<' trrm "convicted." "Nothing on the face of the
statuti:' suggests a congressional intent to limit its coverage
to persons l whose convictions are not subject to collateral
attackj.'' [' nited States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371,373 (1978);
see United States v. ,\ 'aftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 772 (1979). The:
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statutory language is sweeping. and its plain meaning is that
the fact of a felony conviction imposes a firearm disability
until the conviction is vacated or the felon is relieved of his
disabilit by some affirmative action, such as a qualifying
pardon or consent from the Secretary of the Treasury." The
obvious breadth of the language may well reflect the expansive legislative approach revealed by Congress' express findings and declarations. in 18 U. S. C. App. § 1201,n concerning
the problem of firearm abuse by felons and certain specifically
described persons.
Other provisions of the statute demonstrate and reinforce
its broad sweep. Section 1203 enumerates exceptions to
§ 1202 (a) ( 1) (a prison inmate who by reason of his duties has
expressly b<'t'll eutrusted with a firearm by prison authority;
nO ne might argnc, of

cour~P,

that the laugnnge is so swreping that it
Pvert a prr~on whose predicate conviction in
the interim had lwen finally r<•vrr~ed on appeal and thus no longer was
outstanding Tlw Gowrnment, however, does not go so far, Tr. of Oral
Arg. 2H-~O. :{7-.fO, and though W<' have no need io Jursue that extre1
argument in t n:-- ea~r, we rrJrct it
r note, nonetheless, that the di~
abilit~· pffect rd IJ~ · § 1202 (a) ( 1) would apply while a felony conviction
was pendmg ou appeal. See ';';otr, Prior Conviction:> and the Gun Control
Act, of
~' · 1lum. L. Rt•v. 326, :~04, and 11 . 42 (1976 . We are not
per~u:tdt•d that til!' men• po~sibility of making that argument render:,; the
~Statute , n~S prlltiotlt'l' s uggest~. unconstitutionally vague.
6
"Tlw Congn·~:-- tere ))" m ~ an
ec ar "
e erpt, po&>ession,
or tran,;portat lOll uf a firearm b~· felon~, wteran!:> who are discharged under
dishonorable eonclition~, mentn.! incompetents, alienl:l who um illegally in
the rountry, and former ritizeJJR who have renounced thr1r citizenship,
includ e~ Ill it~ pro~cription

constitute~-

"(1) a burdl'n on rommerce or threat affecting the free flow of commerce,
"(2) a thrPat to the ;;afety of the Prrsident of the Fnited States and
Vice Pn·~Jdrnt of tlw United States,
''(B) an unpt·diuwnt or a threat to the exercil:le of free speeC'h and the
free exerC'J:oi<' of a rehgion guamnteed by the first amendment to the Cw1stit utimt of the l l1tited Statr~, and
" ( 4) iL threat t0 the continued and effective O!l<'I'H tion or t hr Govemlnenl of thP Umted States all(! of thr government of earh State guanw- ·
teed by artieh- I\' of the Constitution."

78-1595-0PINION
LBWIS v. UNITED STATES

a person who has been pardoned and who has expressly been
authorized to receive, possess, or transport a firearm). In
addition, § 1202 (c) (2) dennes "felony" to exclude certain
state crimes punishable by no more than two years imprisonment. No exception. however, is made for a person whose
outstanding felony conviction ultimately might turn out to be
invalid for any reason. On its face, therefore, § 1202 (a) (1)
coutaills nothing by way of l'estrictive language. It thus
stands in contrast with other feueral statutes that explicitly
permit a defendant to challenge. by way of defense, the validity or constitutionality of the predicate felony. See, e. g., 18
U.S. C.~ 3575 (e) (dangerous special offender) aud 21 U.S. C.
§ 851 (c) (2) (recidivism under the Comprehensive Drug Prevention and Control Act of 1970).
Wh en we turn to the "legislative history of§ 1202 (a)(1), we
find nothing to suggest that Congress was willing to allow a
defendant to question the validity of his prior conviction as a
defense to a charge under -§ f202 (a) (1). The section was
enacted as part of 'Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Acts of 196"8, 82 Stat. 236. It was added by
way of a floor amendment to the Act and thus was not a subject of discussion in the legislative reports. See United States
v. Batchelder, U. S. --, (1979) (slip op., p. 5);
Scarborough v. United 'States, 431 U. S. 563, 569-570 (1977);
United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 344, and n. 11 (1971).
What lititle legisl ive history there is that is relevant reflects
an intent to impose a firearms disability on any felon based on
the faet of conviction. Senator Long, who introduced and
directed the passage of Title VII, repeatedly stressed convictiOl , 11ot a "valid" conviction, and not a conviction not subject
to constitutioual challenge, as the criterion. For example, the
·Senator observed:
"So, under Title VII. every citizen could possess a gun until
the commission of his first felony. Upon his couviction,.
· however, Title VII would deny every assassin, murderer;,

'.

~.

'

78-1505-0PINION

8

LEWIS v. UNITED STATES

thief and burglar of the right to possess a firearm in the
future except where he has been pardoned by the President or a State Governor and had been expressedly authorized by his pardon to possess a firearm." 114 Cong.
Rcc. 14773 (1968).
See also ~d., at 13868. 14774. Inasmuch as Senator Long was
the sponsor and floor manager of the bill, his statements are
entitled to weight. Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6,
13 (1978).
It is not without significance, furthermore, that Title VII,
as wl'll as Title IV of the Omnibus Act, was enacted in response to the precipitous rise in political assassinations, riots,.
and other violent crimes involving firearms, that occurred in
this COilntry in the 1960's. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th
C'oug., 2<1 Ress., 76-78 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 1577, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1968); S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., :22-2a ( 1968). This Court, accordingly, has observed:
"The legislative history [of Title VII] iu its entirety,
whilE' brief, further supports the view that Congress
sought to rule broadly-to keep guns out of the hands of
thos<' who have demonstrated that 'they may not be
trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to·
society.' " Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S., at
572.
The legislative history, therefore. affords no basis for a
loophole, by way of a collateral constitutional challenge, to
the broad statutory scheme enacted by Congress. Section
1202 (a) was a sweeping prophylaxis, in simple terms, against
misuse of firearms. There is no indication of any intent to
require the Goverument to prove the validity of the predicate
convicti011.
The very structure of the Omnibus Act's Title lV, enacted
simultaneously with Title VII, reinforces this conclusion.
Each Title prohibits categories of presumptively dangerous
person::; from transportiug L
ceiviug firearms. See 18:
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U. S. C. §§ 922 (g) and (h). Actually, with regard to the
statutory question at issue here, we detect little significant
difference between Title IV and Title VII. Each seeks to
keep a firearm away from "any person ... who has been convicted" of a felony, although the definition of "felony" differs
somewhat in the respective statutes. But to limit the scope of
§§ 922 (g)(1) and (h)(1) to a validly convicted felon would
be at odds with the statutory scheme as a whole. Those sections not only impose a disability on a convicted felon but also
on a person under a felony indictment, even if that person
subsequently is acquitted of the felony charge. Siuce the
fact of mere indictment is a disabling circumstance, a fortiori
the much more significant fact of conviction must deprive the
person of a right to a firearm.
Finally, It lS important to note that a convicted felon is
not without relief. As has been observed above, the Omnibus
Act, iu ~~ 1203 (2) and 925 (c), states that the disability may
be removed by a qualif par on or t e Secretary's consen .
Also, petitioner, before obtaining his firearm, could have challenged his prior convictio11 in an appropriate proceeding in
the Florida state courts. See Fla. Const. Art. 5, § 5 (3);
L'Homrned~eu v. State, 362 So. 2d 72 (Fla. App. 1978); Weir
v. State, 319 So. 2d 80 (Fla. App. 1975). See also United
States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954) .7
lt seems fully apparent to us that the existence of these
remedies, two of which are expressly contained in the Omnibus
Act itself, suggests that Congress clearly intended that the
defendant clear his status before obtaining a firearm, thereby
fulfilling Congress' purpose "broadly to keep firearms away
from the persons Congress classified as potentially irresponsible and dangerous.'' Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212,
218 (197o ) .
7 Thi:, bPing ,.;o, § 1202 (a) (1) doe~ not attach "what may amount to lifelong ~a net 1011~ to a mPre finding of probable cau::lP," a~ haiS bPen argued by
one comnH'IJbttor. Sc>e Comment, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1790, 17<95 (1979).

.

~
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With the face of the statute and the legislative history so
c]par, petition<'r's argument that the statute nevertheless
should be construed so as to avoid a constitutional issue is
inapposite. That course is appropriate only when the statute
provides a fair alteruative co11struction. This statute could
not be more plain. Swain v. Pressly, 430 U. S. 370, 378, and
n. 11 (1077); United States v. Batchelder, U. S., a t (slip op .. pp. 7-8). Similarly, any principle of lenity, see
Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971), has no
application. The touchstone of that principle is sta.tutory
ambiguity. HuddlestO'II v. United States, 415 U. S. 814, 832
(1974 }: l/ nited States v. Batchelder, U. S., at (slip
op. , p. 7). There is no ambiguity here.
vVe therefore hold that~ 1202 (a) (1) prohibits a felon from
possessing a firearm despite the fact that the predicate felony
may be subject to collateral attack on constitutional grounds.

IV
The firearm regulatory scheme at issue here is consonant
with the concept of equal protection embodied in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if there is "some
'rational basis' for the statutory distinctions made ... or ...
they 'have some relevance to the purpose for which the
classification is made.' " Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S.
417,422 (1H74), quoting from McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S.
263, 270 (1973), and Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107, 111
(1066). ~ee Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). 8
;, The " rational bm>is" t!:'st i:; applicablr lwrr because lcgil:.;]ative rdianceupon ('Onvict ;;tatu" is not a l511tliJect cla~~ification, and legislative restriction:; on the ll>'<' of firearm:; do not trench upon any fundamental interest.
Sec l 'nited States\, Miller, 307 U, S, 17-l, 17R (19;{9) (the Second Amendment guarantep:,; no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have
"Home rca~unable rei a tiontihip to the pre~ervation or eJf.cirncy of a well
rt"gulated militia") : United i:)tates v, 'l'hrl'e Winchester 30-30 Caliber
Lever Actiu11 Carbiue;s , 504 F , 2d 128~, 1290, n . 5 (CAi 1974); United
States ' , Juhn ;sull, 497 F , 2d 54R (CA-l 1!:17·t); Cudy v. United States, 460
F. 2d 34 (CAH), C('rt. denied, 40!:1 U.S, 1010 (1!:17:2) (the latter three case::l
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SectioJJ 1202 (a)( 1) clearly meets that test. Congress, as
its expressed purpose in enacting Title VII reveals, 18 U. S. C.
App. § 1201, was concerned that the receipt and possession of
a firearm by a felon constitutes a threat, among other things,
to tht> continued and effective operation of the Government of
the U uited States. The legislative history of the gun coutrol
laws discloses Cmtgress' worry about the easy availability of
firearms, especially to those persons who pose a threat to
community peace. And Congress focused on the nexus be~
tween violent crime and the possession of a firearm by any
person with a criminal record. 114 Cong. Rec. 13220 (1968)
(remarks of Se11. Tydings); ·id., at 16298 (remarks of Rep.
Pollock) . Cottgress could rationally conclude that any felony
conviction, even an allegedly invalid one, is a sufficie11t basis
on which to prohibit the possession of a firearm. See e. .,
United States v. Ransom, 515 F. 2d 91-892 (CA5 1975), cert.
denied. 424 F . S. 944 (1976). This Court has recognized
repeatedly that a legislature constitutionally may prohibit a
con vic ted felon from engaging in activities far more fundamental than the right to possess a firearm. See Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 L'. S. 24 (1974) (disenfra.n chisement); De"Veau
v. Brai.~;ted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (proscription against holding
office in a waterfront labor organization); Hawker v. New
York, 170 U. 8. 189 ( 1898) (prohibition against the practice
of medicine) . 1
We recognize, of course, that under the Sixth Amendment
an uncounseled felony conviction cannot be used for certain
purposes. See B·urgett, Tucker, and Loper, all supra. The
Court, however, has 11ever suggested that an uncounseled conviction is invalid for all purposes. See Scott v. Illinois, 440
U. R. 367 ( 1979); Loper v. Beto, 405 U. S., at 482, n. 11
(plurality opinion).
Use of an uncounseled felony conviction as the basis for
holding, rpsprctivPly, that § 1202 (a) (1), § 922 (g), and § 922 (a.) (6) dn
not viol::ttf' thr SPc<md AmendmPnt).

t.

l
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imposing a civil firearms disability, enforceable by a criminal
sanction , is not inconsistent with Burgett, 'Pucker, and Loper.
In each of those cases, this Court found that the subsequent
conviction or sentence violated the Sixth Amendment because
it depf'tHied upon the reliability of a past uucounseled conviction. The federal gun laws. however, focus not on reliability. but 011 the mere fact of conviction, or even indictment, in
onler- to keep firearms away from potentially dangerous persons. C'ongress' judgment that a convicted felon, even one
whose cou victi011 was allegedly uncounseled. is among the class
of persons who should be disabled from dealing in or possessing
firearms because of potential dangerousness is rational. Enforcement of that essentially civil disability through a crimimil
sanction doE's not "support guilt or enhance punishment," see
Buryetf, 389 F. S .. at 115, on the basis of a conviction that is
umeliable when one considers Cougress' broad purpose.
Moreover. unlikE' the situation in Burgett, the sanction imposed
by ~ 1202 (a) (1) attaches immediately upon the defendant's
first collviction.
Again. it is important to note that a convicted felon may
challenge thf' validity of a prior conviction, or otherwise
remove his disability, before obtaining a firearm. We simply
hold tuday that the firearms prosecution does not open the
predicate conviction to a new form of collateral attack. See
Note, Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act of 1968,
76 Colum. L. Rev. 326, 338-339 (1976). Cf. JFalker v. City
of B-ir1,1inyham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.
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.
·
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On Wnt of Cert10ran to the Umted
'
States Court of Appeals for t4~
v.
Fourth Circuit.
·
United States.
[February -,

MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN

19~9]

deliv~red

the opinion of the Court,
This case presents the questiqn whether a defendant'~
extant prior conviction, flawed becau13e he was without counsel, as required by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
may constitute the predicate for a subsequent conviction under
§ 1202 (a)(1) , as amended, of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U. S. C. App,
§ 1202 (a) (1). 1
I
In 1961 petitioner George Calvin Lewis, Jr., upon his plea
Section 1202 (a) reads in full:
person who" ( 1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or
any political subdivision thereof of a felony, or
"(2) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable
conditions, or
"(3) ha~ been adjudged by a court of the United States or of a State
or any political subdivi~ion thereof of being mentally incompetent, or
" ( 4) having been a citizen of the United State;; has renounced his citizenship, or
"(5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully in the United States,
"and who receivrs, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of thi;; Act, any firearm shall be fined
r.ot more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or
both."
1

~'Any

------

-F'EB
- -19- 1980
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of guilty, was convicted in a Florida state court of a felony
for breaking and entering with intent to commit a misde·
meanor. See Fla. Stat. § 810.05 (1961). He served a term of
imprisonment. That conviction has never been overturned,
nor has petitioner ever received a qualifying pardon or per·
mission from the Secretary of the Treasury to possess a fire.
arm. See 18 U. S. C. App. § 1203 (a) and 18 U. S. C.
§ 925 (c).
In January 1977, Lewis, on probable cause, was a.rrested in
Virginia, and later was charged by indictment with having
knowingly received and possessed at that time a specified
firearm, in violation of 18 U. S. C. App. § 1202 (a) (1). 2 He
waived a jury and was given a bench trial. It was stipulated
that the weapon in question had been shipped in interstate
commerce. The Government introduced in evidence an exem·
plified copy of the judgment and sentence in the 1961 Florida
felony proceeding. App. 10.
Shortly before the trial, petitioner's counsel informed the
court that he had been advised that Lewis was not represented
by counsel iu the 1961 Florida proceeding. 3 He claimed that
The indictment also charged petitioner with a violation of 18 U. S. C.
§922 (h)(l). That statute rea.dt:> in pertinent part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person"(!) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any
court of, a crime pumshable by imprbonment for a term exceeding one
year;
2

"to reooive any firearm . .. which has been shipped or transported in
interstate . .. commerce."
Petitioner was acquitted on the § 922 (h) (1) charge and it is not before
us here.
3 Petitioner's coun::;el stated that a Florida attorney had advised him
that the court records in that State showed affirmatively that Lewis had
no lawyer. He noted also that Lewis had been charged with the same
offense as had the defendant in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335
(1963) , and tl11tt petitioner had been tried in the same State about six
month::; before Gideon wa<:> tried. App. 2-3.
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under Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, a violation of § 1202
(a)(1) could not be predicated on a prior conviction obtained
in violation of petitioner's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. The court rejected that claim, ruling that the constitutionality of the outstanding Florida conviction was immaterial with respect to petitioner's status under § 1202 (a)(1)
as a previously convicted felon at the time of his arrest. Petitioner, accordingly, offered no evidence as to whether in fact
he had been convicted in 1961 without the aid of counsel. We
therefore assume, for present purposes, that he was without
counsel at that time.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, by a divided vote, affirmed. 591 F. 2d 978
(1979). It held that a defendant, purely as a defense to a
prosecution under § 1202 (a) (1). could not atta;ck collaterally
an outstanding prior felony conviction, and that the statutory
prohibition applied irrespective of whether that prior conviction was subject to collateral attack. The Court of Appeals
also rejected Lewis' constitutional argument to the effect that
the use of the prior conviction as a predicate for his prosecution under § 1202 (a) (1) violated his rights under the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments.
Because of conflict among the Courts of Appeals,• we
granted certiorari. 442 U. S . - (1979) .
4 Compare United States v. Lufman, 457 F. 2d 165 (CA7 1972) (use of
an underlying felony conviction unconstitutionally obtained to support a
conviction under § 1202 (a) (1) is reversible error) with the Fourth Circuit's ruling in the present case, and with United States v. Maggard, 573
F. 2d 926 (CA6 1978); m1d United States v. Graves, 554 F. 2d 65 (CA3
1977) (en bane) (claim of con:;titutional error in the underlying conviction may not be raised). The Ninth Circuit has distinguished between a
claim of con:;titutional invalidity in the underlying conviction, which it has
held may be raised, and a claim that the underlying conviction has been,
cr should be, reversed on other ground:;. Compare United Stat·es v.
O'Neal, 545 F. 2d 85 (1976), and United States v. Pricepaul, 540 F. 2d
417 (1976), with United States v. Liles, 432 F. 2d 18 (1970). See also
United States v. Herrell, 588 F . 2d 711 (CA9 1978), cert. denied, 440

•f
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II
Four cases decided by .this Court provide the focus for petitioner's attack upon his conviction. The first, and pivotal
one, is Gideon v. Wainwright; supra, where the Court held that
a state felony conviction without counsel, and without a valid
waiver of counsel, was unconstitutional· under the Sixth and'
U. S. 964 (1979) (underlying conviction in a prosecution under 18 U.S. C.

§ 922 (h) (1) may not be challenged on nonconstitutional grounds).
The identical issue that is presented in this case has also Rrisen in the
context of challenges to convictions under 18 U. S. C. § 922 (g) (1) (proscribing shipping or transport of a firearm in interstate or foreign commerce by a person under indictment for, or convicted of, a felony) and
§ 922 (h) (1) (proocribing receipt of a firearm shipped in interstate or
foreign commerce by such a person). Compare United States v. Scales,
599 F. 2d 78 (CA5 1979); Dameron v. United States, 488 F. 2d 724 (CA5
1974); Pasterchik v. United States, 466 F. 2d 1367 (CA9 1972); and
United States v. DuShane, 435 F. 2d 187 (CA2 1970) (underlying conviction may be attacked a::; unconstitutional) with Barker v. · United States,
579 F. 2d 1219, 1226 (CAlO 1978) (underlying conviction may not be so
challenged in prosecution under §922 (h)(1)).
The Courts of Appeals have treated the issue somewhat differently in
prosecutions under 18 U. S. C. § 922 (a) (6) (prohibiting the falsification
of one's status as a convicted felon in purchasing a firearm). Nonuniformity has prevailed nonetheless on the question whether a defendant charged
with violating that statute may challenge the constitutionality of the
underlying felony conviction. Compare United States v. O'Neal, supra,
and United States v. Pricepaul, s·upra, (permitting the challenge) with
United States v. Allen, 556 F. 2d 720 (CA4 1977); United States v.
Graves, supm; and Cassit·y v. United States, 521 F. 2d 1320 (CA6 1975)
(holding that the challenge may not. be made). The Eighth Circuit has
lOtated that it will not permit a challenge to the constitutionality of the
underlying conviction where the defendant is charged under § 922 (a) (6),
while reserving the question undpr § 1202 (a) (1) and §§ 922 (g) (1) and
(h)(1) . United States v. Edwards, 568 F. 2d 68, 70-72, and n. 3 (1977) .
See also United States v. Graves, 554 F. 2d, at 83-88 (Garth, J ., & Seitz,
G. J., concurring & dissenting) (the Government need not prove the
validity of the underlying conviction in a pro~ecution brought under § 922
(a.)(6) , but it must do :;o in a prosecution under§ 1202 (a)(1)).

'

\
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Fourteenth Amendments. That ruling is fully retroactive.
Kitchens v. Smith, 401 U.S. 847 (1971).
The second case is Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109 (1967).
There the Court held that a conviction invalid under Gideon
could not be used for enhancement of punishment under a
State's recidivist statute. The third is United States v.
Tucker, 404 U. S. 443 (1972), where it was held that such a
conviction could not be considered by a court in sentencing
a defendant after a subsequent conviction. And the fourth is
Loper v. Beto, 405 U. S. 473 (1972), where the Court disallowed the use of the conviction to impeach the general
credibility of the defendant. The prior conviction, the plurality opinion said, "lacked reliability." I d., at 484, quoting
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 639, and n. 20 (1965).
We, of course, accept these rulings for purposes of the
present case. Petitioner's position, however, is that the four
~ases require a reversal of his conviction under § 1202 (a) (1)
on both statutory and constitutional grounds.

III
The Court has stated repeatedly of late that in any case
concerning the interpretation of a statute the "starting point"
must be the language of the statute itself. Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp.,- U . S . - , - (1979) (slip op., pp. 3-4). See also
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, U. S. - , (1979)
(slip op., pp. 7-8); Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
- U . S . -, - (1979) (slip op. , p. 6). An examination of
§ 1202 (a) (1) reveals that its proscription is directed unambiguously at any person who "has been convicted by a court
of the United States or of a State ... of a felony." No modifier is present, and nothing suggests any restriction on the
scope of the term "convicted." "Nothing on the face of the
statute suggests a congressional intent to limit its coverage
to persons [whose convictions are not subject to collateral
attack]." United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 373 ( 1978);
see United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 772 (1979). The
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statutory language is sweeping, and its plain meaning is that
the fact of a felony conviction imposes a firearm disability
until the conviction is vacated or the felon is relieved of his
disability by some affirma.tive action, such as a qualifying
pardon or a consent from the Secretary of the Treasury. 5 The
obvious breadth of the language may well reflect the expan·
sive legislative approach revealed by Congress' express findings and declarations, in 18 U. S. C. App. § 1201, 6 concerning
5 One might argue, of coursP, that the language is so sweeping that it
includes in its proscription even a person whose predicate conviction in
the interim had bPCn finally reversed on appeal and thus no longer was
outstanding. The Government, however, does not go so far, Tr. of Oral
Arg. 29-30, 37-40, and though we have no need to pursue that extreme
argument in this case, we reject it. We are not persuaded that the mere
possibility of making that argument renders the statute, as petitioner suggests, unconstitutionally vague. And unlike the dissent, post, at 2, we
view the language Congre<:~s chose as consistent with the common-sense
notion that a disability based upon one's status as a convicted felon
should cease only when the conviction upon which that status depends
has been vacated .
We note, nonetheless, that the disability effected by § 1202 (a) (I) would
apply while a felony conviction was pending on appeal. See Note, Prior
Convictions and the Gun Control Act of 1968, 76 Colum. L. Rev. 326, 334,
and n. 42 (1976) .
6 "The Congress hereby finds and decla.res that the receipt, possession,
or transportation of a firearm by felons, veterans who are discharged under
dishonorable conditions, mental incompetents, aliens who are illegally in
the country, and former citizens who have renounced their citizenship,
constitutes" ( 1) a burden on commerce or threat affecting the free flow of commerce,
"(2) a threat to the safety of the President of the United States and
Vice President of the United States,
"(3) an impediment or a threat to the exercise of free speech and the
free exercise of a religion guaranteed by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and
" (4) a threat to ihe continued and effective operation of the Government of the United States and of the government of each State guaran" teed by article IV of the Constitution."
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the problem of firearm abuse by felons and certain specifically
described persons.
Other provisions of the statute demonstrate and reinforce
its broad sweep. Section 1203 enumerates exceptions to
§ 1202 (a) ( 1) (a prison inmate who by reason of his duties has
expressly been entrusted with a firearm by prison authority;
a person who has been pardoned and who has expressly been
authorized to receive, possess, or transport a firearm). In
addition, § 1202 (c)(2) defines "felony" to exclude certain
state crimes punishable by po more than two years imprisonment. No exception, however, . is made for a person whose,
outstanding felony conviction ultimately might turn out to be
invalid for any reason. On its face, therefore, § 1202 (a) (1)
contains nothing by way of restrictive language. It thus
stands in contrast with other federal statutes that explicitly
permit a defendant to challenge, by way of defense, the valid-.
ity or constitutionality of the predicate felony. See, e. g., 18
U.S. C.§ 3575 (e) (dangerous special offender) and 21 U.S. C.
§ 851 (c) (2) (recidivism under the Comprehensive Drug Prevention and Control Act of 1970).
When we turn to the legislative history of § 1202 (a) ( 1), we
find nothing to suggest that Congress was willing to allow a ,
defendant to question the validity of his prior conviction as a
defense to a charge under § 1202 (a) ( 1). The section was
enacted as part of Title VII of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Acts of 1968, 82 Stat. 236. It was added by
way of a floor amendment to the Act and thus was not a subject of discussion in the legislative reports. See United States
v. Batchelder, 442 U. S. 114, 120 (1979); Scarborough v.
United States, 431 U. S. 563, 569-570 (1977); United States
v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 344, and n. 11 (1971). What little
legislative history there is that is relevant reflects an intent
to impose a firearms disability on any felon based on the
face of conviction. Senator Long, who introduced and directed the passage of Title VII, repea.tedly stressed conviction, not a "valid" conviction, and not a conviction hot §ubject ·
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to constitutional challenge, as the criterion. For example, the
Senator observed:
"So, under Title VII, every citizen could possess a gun until
the commission of his first felony. Upon his conviction,
however, Title VII would deny every assassin, murderer,
thief and burglar of the right to possess a firearm in the
future except where he has been pardoned by the Presi.:.
dent or a State Governor and had been expressedly authorized by his pardon to possess a firearm." 114 Cong.
Rec. 14773 (1968).
See also id., at 13868, 14774. Inasmuch as Senator Long was
the sponsor and floor manager of the bill, his statements are
entitled to weight. Simpson v. United States, 435 U. S. 6,
13 (1978).
It is not without significance, furthermore, that Title VII,
as well as Title IV of the Omnibus Act, was enacted in response to the precipitous rise in political assassinations, riots,
and other violent crimes involving firearms, that occurred in
this country in the 1960's. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., 76-78 (1968); H. R. Rep. No. 1577, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., 7 (1968); S. Rep. No. 1501, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., 22-23 (1968). This Court, accordingly, has observed:
"The legislative history [of Title VII] in its entirety,
while brief, further supports the view that Congress
sought to rule broadly-to keep guns out of the hands of
those who have demonstrated that 'they may not be
trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to
society.' " Scarborough v. United States, 431 U. S., at
572.
The legislative history, therefore, affords no basis for a
loophole, by way of a collateral constitutional challenge, to
the broad statutory scheme enacted by Congress. Section
1202 (a) was a sweeping prophylaxis, in simple terms, against
misuse of firearms. There is no indication of any intent to
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,equire the Government to prove the validity of the predicate
conviction.
The very structure of the Omnibus Act's Title IV, enacted
simultaneously with Title VII, reinforces this conclusion.
Each Title prohibits categories of presumptively dangerous
persons from transporting or receiving firearms. See 18
U. S. C. §§ 922 (g) and (h). Actually, with regard to the
statutory question at issue here, we detect little significant
difference between Title IV and Title VII. Each seeks to
keep a firearm away from "any person ... who has been convicted" of a felony, although the definition of "felony" differs
somewhat in the respective statutes. But to limit the scope of
§§ 922 (g) (1) and (h)(1) to a validly convicted felon would
be at cdds with the statutory scheme as a whole. Those sec..
tions not only impose a disability on a convicted felon but also
on a person under a felony indictment, even if that person
subsequently is acquitted of the felony charge. Since the
fact of mere indictment is a disabling circumstance, a fortiori
the much more significant fact of conviction must deprive the
person of a right to a firearm.
Finally, it is important to note that a convicted felon is
not without relief. As has been observed above, the Omnibus
Act, in §§ 1203 (2) and 925 (c), states that the disability may
be removed by a qualifying pardon or the Secretary's consent
Also, petitioner, before obtaining his firearm, could have challenged his prior conviction in an appropriate proceeding in
the Florida state courts. See Fla. Const. Art. 5, § 5 (3);
L'Hommedieu v. State, 362 So. 2d 72 (Fla. App. 1978); Weir
v. State, 319 So. 2d 80 (Fla. App. 1975). See also United
States v. Morgan, 346 U. S. 502 (1954) .7
It seems fully apparent to us that the existence of these
remedies, two of which are expressly contained in the Omnibus
7 This being so, § 1202 (a) (1) doe:snot attach "what may amount to lifelong sanctions to a mere finding of probable cause," as has been argued by
one commentator. See Comment, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 1790, 1795 (1979).

,I
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Act itself, suggests that Congress clearly intended that the
defendant clear his status before obtaining a firearm, thereby
fulfilling Congress' purpose "broadly to keep firearms away
from the persons Congress classified as potentia.lly irresponsible and dangerous." Barrett v. United States, 423 U. S. 212,
218 (1976).
With the face of the statute and the legislative history so
clear, petitioner's argument that the statute nevertheless
should be construed so as to avoid a constitutional issue is
inapposite. That course is appropriate only when the statute
provides a fair alternative construction. This statute could
not be more plain. Swain v. Press[y, 430 U. S. 370, 378, and
n. 11 (1977); United States v. Batchelder, U. S., a t (slip op., pp. 7-8). Similarly, any principle of lenity, see
Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971), has no
application. The touchstone of that principle is statutory
ambiguity. Huddleston v. United States, 415 U. S. 814, 832
(1974); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U. S., at 121-122.
There is no ambiguity here.
We therefore hold that§ 1202 (a)(l) prohibits a felon from
possessing a firearm despite the fact that the predicate felony
may be subject to collateral attack on constitutional grounds.

IV
The firearm regulatory scheme at issue here is consonant
with the concept of equal protection embodied in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if there is "some
1
rational basis' for the statutory distinctions made ... or ...
they 1have some relevance to the purpose for which the
classification is made.'" Marshall v. United States, 414 U. S.
417, 422 (1974), quoting from McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S.
263, 2i0 (1973), and Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U. S. 107, Ill
(1966). See Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).8
These legislative restrictions on the u;;e of firearms are neither based
upon constitutionally suspect criteri<L, nor do they trench upon any con8

\

78-1595-0PINION
LEWIS v. UNITED STATES

11

Section 1202 (a)(1) clearly meets that test. Congress, as
its expressed purpose in enacting Title VII reveals, 18 U. S. C.
App. § 1201, was concerned that the receipt and possession of
a firearm by a felon constitutes a threat, among other things,
to the continued and effective operation of the Government of
the United States. The legislative history of the gun control
laws discloses Congress' worry about the easy availability of
firearms, especially to those persons who pose a threat to
community peace. And Congress focused on the nexus be~
tween violent crime and the possession of a firearm by any
person with a criminal record. 114 Cong. Rec. 13220 (1968)
(remarks of Sen. Tydings); {d., at 16298 (remarks of Rep.
Pollock). Congress could rationally conclude that any felony
conviction, even an allegedly invalid one, is a sufficient basis
on which to prohibit the possession of a firearm. See, e. g.,
United States v. Ransom, 515 F. 2d 885, 891-892 (CA5 1975),
cert. denied , 424 U. S. 944 ( 1976). This Ccmrt has recognized
repeatedly that a legislature constitutionally may prohibit a
convicted felon from engaging in activities far more fundamental than the possession of a firearm. See Richardson v.
Ramirez, 418 U. S. 24 (1974) (disenfranchisement); DeVeau
v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960) (proscription against holding
office in a waterfront labor organization); Hawker v. New
York, 170 U. S. 189 ( 1898) (prohibition against the practice
of medicine).
We recognize, of course, that under the Sixth Amendment
an uncounseled felony conviction cannot be used for certain
stitutionally protected liberties. See United States v. Miller, 307 U. S.
174, 178 (1939) (the Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and
bear a firearm that doe~ not have "~orne reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.") ; United States v.
Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines, 504 F. 2d 1288,
1290, n. 5 (CA7 1975); United States v. Johnson, 497 F. 2d 548 (CA4
1974) ; Cody v. United States, 460 F. 2d 34 (CAB), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1010 (1972) (the latter three case~ holding, respectively, that§ 1202 (a.) (1),
§922 (g), and §922 (a)(6) do not violate the Second Amendment).
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purposes. See Burgett, Tucker, and Loper, all supra. The
Court, however, has never suggested 'tHat an uncounseled conIllinois, 440
viction is invalid for all purposes. See Scott
U. S. 367 (1979); Loper v. Beto, 405 U. S., at 482, n, 1~
(plurality opinion).
Use of an uncounseled felony conviction as the basis for
imposing a civil firearms disability, enforceable by a criminal
sanction, is not inconsistent with Burgett, Tucker, and Loper.
In each of those cases, this Court found that the subsequent
~onviction or sentence violated the Sixth Amendment becau~e
it depended upon the reliability of a '· past uncounseled conviction. The federal gun laws, however, focus not on reliability, but on the mere fact of conviction, or even indictment, in
order to keep firearms away from potentially dangerous persons. Congress' judgment that a convicted felon, even one
whose conviction was allegedly uncounseled, is among the class
of persons who should be disabled from dealing in or possessing
firearms because of potential dangerousness is rational,D Enforcement of that essentially civil disability through a criminal
sanction does not "support guilt or enhance punishment," seE(
Burgett, 389 U. S., at 115, on the basis of a conviction that is
Unreliable when one considers Congress' broad purpose.
Moreover, unlike the situation in Burgett, the sanction imposed
b'y § 1202 (a) (1) attaches immediately upon the defendant's
first conviction.
Again, it is important to note that a convicted felon may
phallenge the validity of a prior conviction, or otherwise
remove his disability, before obtaining a firearm. We simply
hold today that the firearms prosecution does not open the
predicate conviction to a new form of collateral attack. See

v.

9 The disl:lent's a:::sertion that CongrE'Ss' judgment in thi~; regard cannot
rationally be supported, post , at 5, is one we do not share. Moreover,
such an as.~ertion seems. plainly inconsistent with the deference that a
reviewing court ::;hould give to a legi8lative determination that, in e::;::;ence,
predicts a potential for future criminal behavior.

'
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Note,
Prior Convictions and the Gun Control Act of 1968,
,,
.
7Q.' Colum. L. Rev. 326, 338-339 (1976). .Cf. Walker v. Ctty
o('Binningham, 388 U.S; 307 (1967).
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

it

is so ordered.
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[February -, 1980]
JusTICE BR~<::NNAN , dissenting.
In disagreement with every other· court of a:rpeals that has
a,ddressed the issuc, 1 the· Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, held, by a divided vote, that an uncounseled and
hence unconstitutional felony conviction may 'form the predicate for conviction undPr ~ 1202 (a) (.1) · of the Omnibus·
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act ·of Hl68. Today the
&>urt a.fflrms that judgment, but by an an11lysis that cannot
be squared either with the literal lang~.Jage of the statute
or controlling decisions of this Court,1 l respectfully dissent.
MR.

i
Two longstanding principles of statutory ·construction independently mapdfl.te reversal of petitioner's conviction. The ·
first is the precept that "when choice has to be made between
two readings of what conduct Congress bas made a crime, it is
appropriate, before we choose the h11rsher alternative, to
require that Congress should have spoken in language that is
clear and definite." United States y. Universal C. I. T. Credit
Corp. , 344 U. S. 218, 221-222 (1~52), '],.'he Court has reSee, e1 g., Dumeron v. United States, 488 F. 2q 724 (CA5 1974);
United States v. Lufma:n, 457 F. 2d 165 (CA7 1972); United States v.
DuShane, 4:~5 F. 2d 187 (CA2 1970); United States v. Thoreson, 428 F.
1

2d 654 ~CA9 1970) . See generally Comment 1 92 l1arv. L. Rev. 1790
(197~),
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peatedly reaffirmed-this "rule of lenity." See, e. g., Simpson
v. Un'ited States, 435 U.S. 6, 14 (1978); United States v. Bass,
404 U. S. 336, 347-349 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401
U. S. 808, 812 (1971); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169,
177 (1958); Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81 (1955). Indeed, the principle that "au1biguity concerning the ambit of
criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity" has
previously been invoked in interpreting the very provision
at issue i11 this case. See UnitfJd -states v. Bass, supra.
The Court declines to apply this established rule of construction in this case because. in its view, "l t Jhere is no
ambiguity here. " Ante, a,t 10. In light of the gloss the
Court place~ ou the litE>ral language of the statute, I find
this to be a curious conclusion. By its own terms, § 1202
(a)(l) reaclws "any person who has been convicted . .. of a
felony. " The provision on its face a,dmits of no exception to
its sweeping proscriptio11. Y f't despite the absence of auy
qualifying ,phrase. the Court concedes-as it must-that the
statutP cannot be interpreted so as to include those persons
whose predicate convictions have been vacated or reversed 011
appeal. Ante, at 6, and n. 5.
It thus appears that the plain words of § 1202 (a) (1) are
not so clear after aJl, aHd Wf' therefore must determine the
section's reach. Two a1ternative constructions are offered:
The first is the Government's-that § 1202 (a) (1) may be
read to permit only outstanding felony convictions to serve
as the basis for prosecution. Tr. of Oral Arg. 29-30. The
second is petitioner's-that the predicate conviction must not
only be outstanding, but also constitutionally valid. Because
either interpretation fairly comports with the statutory language, surely the principle of lenity requires us to resolve :;tny
doubts against the harsher alternative and to read the statute
to prohibit the possession of firearms only by those who have
been constitutionally convicted of a f~lony.
!fhe Court nev~rth~less adopts ~he O~v~rnment's rl)nsttruc,.
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tion, relying on a supposed legislative resolve to enact a
sweeping measure against the misuse of firearms. But however expansive § 1202 was meant to be, we ~re not faithful
to "our duty to protect the rights of the individual," Dalia.
v. United States, 441 U. S. 238, 263 (1979) ( STEVENS, J., dissen ting), when we are so quick to ascribe to Congress the
intent to punish the possession of a firearm by a person whose \
predicate f<'lony conviction was obtained in violation of the
right to the assistance of counsel, "one of the safeguards of the
Sixth Amendment deemed ncc('ssary to insure fundamental
human rights of life and liberty. '' Johnson v. Zerbst, 3!»
U. S. 458, 462 (1938). Petitioner has once already been imprisoned in violation of the Constitution. In the absence
of any clear congressional expression of its intent, I cannot
accept a construction of ~ 1202 (a) (1 )' that reflects such an
indifference to petitio11er's plight and such a derogation of the
principles of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). 2
2 As the Court, has pr·rviously oh~rrved, '§ 1202 "'was hastilr pass~d,
w'it.h little cli~cu~;;ion, no hettring:.:, and no report,.'' United States v.
Bass, 404 l'. S. :3:36,:344 (1971). ''In :-:hort, 'the legisla.llive hi.;tory of [the]
Act. hardly spPakH with that elarit~· of purpo~e which Congress ~upposedly
furnishrs conrt>< in ordPr to PnahlP thrm t.o enforce its tnlC will.'" I d.,
nt 846 (quot-ing Cnium;al Came1'a Corp. v. NLI~B, 340 U. S. 474, 483
(1951) ) . 1!. is tlJU:-; little wonder that the Comt. finds no explicit support
in the ;;.tatut(''"' legislat.ivC' hi:;tory for petitionrr'8 con::.inrcti011.
Nor do the few t;Jgnpo:-;ts that do exi~t in the history and :structure of
Title VII point. unnmbiguou;:ly to thP Court/:; conclusion. That Congress
included provii'iion~< wit.hin the Omnibu:o: Act whereby a convicted felon
could have hiR di~abilit~r removed b~· a qualifying pardon or the Secre~
tary's con>"Put., l"it't' §§ l:!o:3 (2) and 925 (c), does not mean that, Congrc~s
intenck•d th('lll to h(1 Pxclusive remrdir,;. Indeed, the~t> provi:;ions were
clearly dC':>igned only t<l provide a mechani"m for tho::;e twrson~ with
valid fplony convict ion:,: to l"ieek n•lief from the prohibitions of § 1202.
Similnrly, a compari~on betwP('Jl the' ::;cope of Title IV and Titl€'1 VII
is uncnlightC'ning on thr quel"ilion hdorl' u,;. Simply because U1e former
sect ion impo:.:eR a di"ability on a.n~· ]Wt'::<on under n felon~ · indictment, it'
by no mran" follow,:, a fo1'ti01i or othet·wi"(', that. Congre:;f' intended hy the
latter "ect·iou l<J itullO>ll' '~ :-;onwwhat, ha.r:-:hrr rli"ability on those person~
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The second maxim of statutory construction that comp('ls
a narrow reading of ~ 1202 (a)( 1) is the "cardinal principle"
that "if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, . . .
this Court will first ascertain whC'ther a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided." C1·owell Y. Bensuu, 285 U. S. 22. 62 (1932). Accord.
Schneider v. Smith, 390 1J. A. 17. 26 (1968); United States
v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41. 45 ( 1953); United Stales v. C. I. 0.,
335 U. A. 106. 120-121. and n. 20 (1948). And doubts as to
the constitutio11ality of a statute that could predicate criminal
liability solely ou tlw existellC(' of a previous uncounseled
felony COilvictio11 arc> indeed S('rions. for a trilogy of this Court's
decisions would S('('ll1 to proh ihit wecis('ly such a result.
Burgett "· 'l'e:ras, 389 r. R. 109 (1967). held that a prio·r
uncoutlSe1<'d felony conviction wl:IS void and thus inadmissible
in a proS{'eution under a Texas recidivist statut('. Burgett
stated: "To permit a conviction ohtain<'d in violation of Gideon
v. vVainwriuht to be us<·d against a p('rson either to support
guilt or enhance punishment for another offense . . . is to
erode the principle of that case. \Yorse yet. since the defect
in the prior conviction was denial of the right to counsel, the
accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that
Sixth Amendment right." ld .. at 115 (citation omitt('d).
United States v. Tucker, 404 U. S. 443 ( 1972), and Loper v.
with uuron:stitutional frlony conviction,;. Cf. ante, at. 9. Siguifieantly,
the re~trietion~ attaching to an individual under indictmC'nt. a.rC' nree;;sarily [.C'mpora.r:v, whilt> tho.'iP im]>OSPd on the hasiN of a prc•viouH <'ouviction are inddini1<\ in duration. ~forP0\'<'1', Congrr~:<' failurr to include
pNsous "undrr indictnwnt" within til<' pro:<eription:< of § 1202 morr plausibly signall:i itf< dP~irc to demand a gn•:\trr indication of pot entia] da.ngerousne;o;N tha11 would be provided by the mere fact of indictment-or, for
that. matlrr, by all uncoun><clrd ft>lony co11viction. In fad, in a. !'\lightly
differenL eonlext, Congrr~,; has cxprrs~l~· n•jrcted U1e proposition that an
invalid prior couvictiou i::> a reli~tblr indicator of ''dnJJgerousne~~." Sec H~
V: S. C: § 3575 (c) (~augerous ~pPcial offPnder):

1
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Beto, 405 U. S. 473 (1972), respectively prohibited the use _
of uncounseled. felony convictions as a factor to be considereq
in sentencing, and to impeach the defendant's credibility.
Burgett and its progeny appear to co11trol the result in this /
case. The clear teaching of those d:ecisions is that an uncounscled felony convictiol1 can never be Used "to support guilt or
enhance punishment for another offimse." Here, petitioner
could n~t have been ttie~ ~nd con_victed for violat~n~ § 1202' \
(&)(1) m the absence of Ius prE!Vtous fEllony conviCtiOn. It
could not be plainer tnat his constitutionally void. conviction
was therefore used "to support guilt" for the current offense.
The Court's bald assertion to tlie contrary is simply
inexplicable.
The Court's attempt to distinguish Burgett, Tucker, and
Loper on the ground that thf' validity of the subsequent
convictions or sentences in those cases depended on the reliability of the prior uncounseled felony convictions, while in
the presfnt case the law focuses on the mere fact of the prior
·conviction, is unconvincing. The fundamentfl,l rationale behind those decisions was the concern that according any
credibility to an uncounseled conviction would seriously erode
the protections of the Sixth Amendment. Congress' decision
to include convicted felons within the class of persons prohibited from possessing firearms can rationally be supported
only if the historical fact of conviction is indeed a reliable
indicator of potential dangerousness. As we have so often
said, denial of the right to counsel impeaches "the very integrity of the fact-finding process." Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U. S. 618, 639 (1965). Accord, Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U. S.
333, 341 (1978); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U. S. 25, 31
(1972). And the absence of counsel impairs the reliability
of a felony conviction just as much when used to prove po- {
tial dangerousness as wfwn used as direct proof of guilt. lj
lA. Loper v. Beto , supra, 405 U. S., at 483 (opinion of /

I

STEWART,

J.).

,·.·
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III
Finally, it is simply irrelevant that petitioner could have
challenged the validity of his prior conviction in appropriate
proceedings in the state courts. Nor can the existence of
such a remedy prohibit him from raising the unconstitutionality of that conviction as a defehse to the present charge.
In the first place, neither Burgett nor Loper imposed any
requirement that a defendant collaterally attack his uncounseled conviction before he faces prosecution under § 1202
(a) ( 1); in both cases the Court held the use of the prior
invalid convictions impermissible even though the defendants
had taken no affirmative steps to have them overturned.
More to the point, however, where the very defect in the
initial proceedings was that the accused did not have the
assistance of counsel in defending the felony charges against
him, it simply defies reason and sensibility to suggest that
the defendant must be regarded as having waived his defense
to the § 1202 (a) ( 1) prosecution because he failed first to
reta:in counsel to seek an extraordinary writ of coram nobis.
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